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NATIONALIZED POLITICAL DISCOURSE*
Robert F. Nagel**
I. CURRENT DISINTEREST IN STATE-BASED DISCOURSE
Several prominent efforts to emphasize the importance of the
political arena as a forum for constitutional discourse assign little or
no role to state institutions. Bruce Ackerman, for example, claims
that "the people" have established constitutional meaning while
mobilized into extraordinarily intense debate.! The interbranch
struggle that spawns these "constitutional moments" involves
"institutional deadlock in Washington," and the mechanism by which
"the people" speak is the national election. 2 Similarly, Robin West's
argument for a progressive "reconstruction" of the Fourteenth
Amendment asserts that the appropriate forum for this radical
reinterpretation is the United States Congress.' Indeed, West's book
hardly mentions federalism, and one of her main tenets, the "solesovereignty principle," appears on its face to be hostile to state
authority of any kind, let alone state-based constitutional dialogue.4
Mark Tushnet's call for constitutional interpretation outside the
courts speaks of "the people" as an undifferentiated national entity
and does not mention the possibility that their constitutional discourse
might be organized within state-based institutions.' And, finally, a
range of proposals for reining in the Court-from initiating term
limits for justices to authorizing congressional override of specific
judicial decisions-presupposes increased constitutional deliberation
within national institutions.6
* A version of this paper will appear as a part of Robert F. Nagel, The Implosion of
American Federalism (Oxford, forthcoming 2001). This material is copyrighted by,
and used with the permission of, Oxford University Press.
** Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Professor of Constitutional Law and Director, Byron R.
White Center for the Study of American Constitutional Law, University of Colorado
School of Law.
1. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 6-7 (1991).

2. Ld. at 48-50.
3. Robin West, Progressive Constitutionalism: Reconstructing the Fourteenth
Amendment 219 (1994).
4. See id.
at 31.
5. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999).
6. For a useful survey and analysis of such proposals, see Paul D. Carrington,
Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correctingthe Ercessive Independence
of the Supreme Court, 50 Ala. L. Rev. 397,453-62 (1999). Carrington's own proposals
also focus on national institutions: term limits for the justices and a "devolutionary
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While on the whole this concentration on national decision-making
is not surprising under present circumstances, it should not be taken
for granted.7 State institutions, of course, were a part of the
ratification process for the Constitution of 1787 and since then have
played their prescribed part in the process for formal amendment. As
for interpretation, throughout much of our history state-based
decision-makers have played an important role in defining and
protecting rights.8 Even in the recent era of intense nationalization,
states have created various pressures that have led the federal courts,
despite some caterwauling, to alter their interpretations.9 From a
historical perspective, then, the decision of so many legal
commentators to fixate on nationalized constitutional dialogue is a
significant departure.
Contemporary fixation on nationalized dialogue is puzzling in at
least one other respect. Like just about all other observers,
nationalistic legal scholars presumably know about the occasionally
low quality of national political discourse. They must notice the
simplifications, the exaggerations, and the nastiness of presidential
campaigns. They must shake their heads at the insincere posturing
that often takes place in congressional committee hearings and the
vacuousness that can characterize floor debate. And surely they must
view at least some judicial confirmation hearings as jurisprudentially
superficial and excessively personal.
There are many possible ways to reconcile a commitment to
nationalized constitutional discourse with severe aversion to aspects
of nationalized political discourse. It could be, for instance, that the
defects in political dialogue that inspire so much disappointment and
scorn are in fact the exception rather than the norm. Or maybe the
subject matter of constitutional discourse would inspire the public and
their political leaders to improve on their ordinary performances. Or,
since many legal scholars acknowledge that judicial opinions are often

amendment" authorizing a congressional super-majority to override judicial opinions
that excessively intrude on state and local governments. Id.
7. For writings that do not ignore dialogue at the state and local level, see, e.g.,
Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 64
U. Colo. L. Rev. 975 (1993); Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving InterpretiveAutonomy:
Insights From the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 Const. Comment. 315 (1994);
Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
ConstitutionalLaw, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410 (1993); Keith E. Whittington, The Political
Constitution of Federalism in Antebellum America: The Nullification Debate as an
Illustration of Informal Mechanisms of Constitutional Change, Publius, Spring 1996;
Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law (1992).
8. See Moore, supra note 7, at 353; Whittington, supra note 7, at 3-11. More
generally, see John J. Dinan, Keeping the People's Liberties: Legislators, Citizens,
and Judges as Guardians of Rights (1998).
9. See, e.g., Fisher & Devins, supra note 7, at 197-302 (discussing abortion and
race).
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overstated, confused, and formulaic, perhaps even flawed political
debate would be better than the interpretations of judges.
My theme here is that these comforting possibilities underestimate
the extent to which deficiencies in nationalized political discourse are
inherent in modem circumstances. By this, of course, I do not mean
that there can never be useful or even inspiring debate at the national
level. All that I mean to say is that the kinds of contemporary
communicative deficiencies that are commonly seen and decried
should be expected to characterize enhanced constitutional dialogue
at the national level.
This thesis does not imply that discourse organized around more
localized institutions would necessarily be of high quality.
Decentralized discourse does, I think, have certain clear advantages
over nationalized debate, but these advantages only make admirable
dialogue possible, not inevitable. Moreover, one of my central themes
is that an important cost of the centralization of political discourse
under current conditions is that it impoverishes more localized
communication.
I will proceed by first describing and analyzing some rather typical
instances of deficient political dialogue. (For my purposes, the
decisions of courts are simply additional illustrations of deficient
political communication because they are subject to many of the same
structural pressures as other forms of public discourse.) I will then
attempt to explain why these deficiencies are inherent in nationalized
dialogue under modem conditions.
II. THE DISMAYING NATURE OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
Here, then, is an assortment of rather typical modem political
communications-an assortment that at first appears odd and
discordant but that, on reflection, forms a coherent and discouraging
picture:
Duringhis State of the Union speech, a president looked towards his
wife in the balcony and mouthed the words, "I love you.""IThe same
president had on a number of earlier occasions, while embroiled in a
very public controversy involving his sexual infidelities, been filmed
leaving church prominently carrying a Bible." This president is
without doubt a brilliant communicator with almost movie star
charisma, and both his speech and his public religiosity were widely
regardedas politicalsuccesses.

10. See Thomas L. Friedman, The Grand Bargain, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1999, at
A25.
11. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1998, at Al (photograph and caption).
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Duringhis State of the State address a governor of Alabama stated as
follows:
[W]hen a state or federal court- a part of the non-lawmakingjudicial
branch of government-rules that an establishment of a national
religion has occurred by posting the Ten Commandments on a
courtroom wall.., or presenting a nativity scene in school... or
offering a pre-gameprayer by coaches and players or praying for the
safety of our soldiers in harm's way by a class at school, or
acknowledging God at a graduation ceremony... such court has
violated the U.S. Constitution to which you and I and all the Judges
have taken an oath of office to uphold.... Today, across this land
governors, U.S. Congressmen, U.S. Senators, State legislators, legal
scholars, and the people are deeply concerned over reckless, illegal,
and arrogant rulings by our imperialjudiciary. I will be true to my
conscience and my oath of office and resist illegal usurpation of
authority by any court with all legal and political means I can
muster.12

These words, despite being supplemented with historical and legal
documentation, were greeted by commentators with open derision. The
governor who spoke them lost in the next election.

In 1989 the Pennsylvania House of Representatives was debating a
bill that would impose a number of restrictions on the right to
abortion-restrictionsthat would eventually be litigated before the
United States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 13 and
would elicit from that Court cries of anguish about political attacks on
the legitimacy of its decisions. One of the chief proponents of the bill
rose to say asfollows:
Remember what Roe v. Wade said, and what it said was that
abortions which are necessary are permitted. So the issue comes
down to, what is a necessary abortion? It strikes me, for example, that
even the old court would find that it is not a necessary abortion to
have sex selection; that it was not an infringement on an abortion to

have informed consent; that in fact an abortion after 24 weeks, except
to save the mother's life or to avert substantial and irreversible
impairment of major bodily flmction, can never be considered
necessary. So there is a framework there right now where in fact each
provision could be ruled constitutional. Remember this, however:
Simply stated, when you cut to the chase, constitutionalityis what five
12. Gov. Fob James, State of the State Address (Jan. 13, 1998) (transcript
available in Alabama Department of Archives and History, Alabama Governors
Press Secretary Subject File, Montgomery, Alabama) [hereinafter James, State of the
State Address].
13. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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or more 14Justices of the United States Supreme Court at any given time

say it is.

Proponents of the Bill also insisted that their legislation was consistent
with other Supreme Court precedent and, indeed, that to the extent that
the Bill might alter existing case law, justices on tie Court had
effectively invited an opportunity to rethink their earlierdecisions.
For their part, opponents argued that tie Bill would be
unconstitutional under existing case law and that this fact precluded
enactment:
So... we will pass today an unconstitutionalact, in violation of our
oath, in the hopes that perhaps, by inferences, some members of the
Supreme Courtmay change theirminds.... Right now the law of tile
land is the Supreme Court's current determination. That is what we
are bound to abide by. 6

During his confirmation hearing on his nomination to the Supreme
Court, a nominee is asked whether "there is a core of political speech
that's entitled to greater constitutional protection than other forms of
speech". The nominee, a former professor and judge, replied by
referringto "what I think of as dialogue in a civilized society. " He went
on:
Actually, it is Michael, my son, who really gave me a good
compliment once that set me thinking about this.
What he said was, well, we used to argue a lot at the dinner table, I
mean discuss, and he said, "You know... I always felt you were
listening to me. " That, of course, doesn't always mean we agree. But,
you see, there is something in that idea of listening that promotes tie
dignity of the person who is listened to.
I have noticed... [that if a judge listens to both sides in court] it
promotes a good feeling, because people feel they have been listened
17
to, even if you disagreed with them ....
Similar episodes in confirmation hearings are now legion. An earlier
nominee to the Court, for example, replied to a question about his
understandingof a woman's position in facing an unwanted pregnancy
by recallingthat twenty-four years earlieras a dormitory proctorhe had
14. Pa. House of Representatives, 173d Sess. 1989 Leg. J.of the House 1755
(1989) (statement of Mr. Freind).
15. Id. at 1756.
16. Id. (statement of Mr. Itkin).
17. Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong. 160 (1994) (statement of Judge Stephen G. Breyer).
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had a conversation with a young pregnant woman who was uncertain
and upset.
This nominee did not reveal the content of that
conversation, but he did mention that it took two hours, was held in the
most private place he could find, and that he had counseled her. He
concluded by saying, "And I think the only thing I can add to that is I
know what you [Senator Howard Metzenbaum] are trying to tell me,
because I remember that afternoon."18

Duringjoint Senate/House committee hearings on the "Partial-birth
Abortion Ban Act," the Legislative Director of the National Right to
Life Committee quoted a physician who had performed the procedure
as follows:
With a lower fetal extremity in the vagina, the surgeon uses his fingers
to deliver the opposite lower extremity, then the torso, the shoulders
and the upper extremities. The skull lodges at the internalcervical os,
the opening to the uterus.... At this point, the right-handedsurgeon
slides the fingers of the left hand along the back of the fetus and
"hooks" the shoulders of the fetus with the index and ring fingers
(palm down) .... The surgeon takes a pair of blunt curved
Metzenbaum scissors in the right hand. He carefully advances the tip,
curved down, along the spine and under his middle finger until he
feels it contact the base of the skull under the tip of his middle
finger ....The surgeon then forces the scissors into the base of the
skull ....The surgeon removes the scissors and introduces a suction
catheterinto this hole and evacuates the skull content.19
Shocking descriptions, of course, are used by both sides of the
abortion debate. In defending the proposed Freedom of Choice Act of
1992, a senator stated, "When abortion was illegal... [t/housands of
women died at the hands of back alley butchers... " and he quoted a
physician as saying:
I have seen firsthand the horrors of illegal abortions....I know of
women who were blindfolded and alone, moved by total strangers
fiom place to place before they were brought to a secret place where
the abortion was
performed and then left on a street corner to find
20
their way home.

18. Nomination of David H. Souter to be an AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court

of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,101st Cong.
115 (1990) (statement of Judge David H. Souter).
19. Partial-BirthAbortion: The Truth, Joint Hearing before the Senate Comm. on

the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 39 (1997) (statement of Douglas Johnson) (brackets and
ellipses omitted) [hereinafter Joint Hearing].
20. 138 Cong. Rec. 5813 (1992) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
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The voice that comes over my National Weather Service radio is
oddly mechanical. It has no normal cadence or inflection or accent,
and it mispronounces local place names. One morning it delivered a
lengthy warning about the onset of tornado season in my home state of
Colorado. The voice advised that people should not try to outrun a
tornado, that in an emergency they can seek shelter in a ditch, and that
if someone does lie in a ditch it is important to watch out for running
water. Despite its solicitous (not to say, condescending) advice, the
voice is not human. It is a computer-generated voice that is used
throughoutthe country.

The impersonality of this expression of governmental concern may
be extreme, but less stark examples are commonplace. For instance, a
television advertisement sponsored by the Department of Health and
Human Services shows a series of photographs of a charming child
while a voice intones: "Hisfather left today. Forever. He'll be twice as
likely to drop out of high school. Thirty percent more likely to attempt
suicide. Even if you don't live with your kids, your emotional and
financialsupportgives them a better chance." The screen fades to black
behind these words: THEY'RE YOUR KIDS BE THEIR DAD. The
child, of course, is an actor. The voice belongs to no one in particular
and is readingfrom a script.

One of the most intellectually formidable federal judges in the
country faced the question whether nude dancing "of barroom variety"
is speech protected by the First Amendment.2' The judge's opinion
contains references to the satyr plays of the ancient Greeks, the Folies
Bergere, the Dance of the Seven Veils in Richard Strauss' opera
Salome, Diaghilev's L'Apres midi d'un faune, Isadora Duncan, Les
Ballets Africains de Keita Fodeba, Richard Strauss' Ein Heldenleben,
Gustav Holst's The Planets, and Debussy's La Cadiddraleengloutie as
well as to several important treatises on the history of dance and
eroticism, includingSachs, World History of the Dance (1937).3 It also
contains the judge's evaluation of the actual dances at issue in the case:
"The dancers are presentable although not striking young women.

21. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1082, 1089 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J., concurring).
22. E.g., id. at 1089, 1090, 1093.
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They dance on a stage, with vigor but without accomplishment....
It notes that the goal of erotic dancing is to "express erotic emotions,
such as sexual excitement and longing" and attempts a brief explanation
of how striptease accomplishes this goal: "Nudity is the usual state in
which sexual intercourse is conducted in our culture, and disrobing is
preliminary to nudity .... [The dance] make[s] plain that the
performer is not removing her clothes because she is about to take a
bath.., or undergo a medical examination ....
.

Some years ago the Minnesota Supreme Court faced the question
whether a drunk driving suspect has the right under the state's
constitution to consult a lawyer before taking a breath test. 5 The court
referred to previous cases where it had adopted a requirement that the
state demonstrate a "compelling state interest"for vehicularsafety rules
and that the rules were the "least restrictive alternative.126 It then
adopted something called the "criticalstage" test for the right to counsel
and went on to say that the denial of access to counsel had to "be
weighed againstthe state's interests."27

No doubt it is possible to select from the world of contemporary
political communications-from the misleading political ads, the
windy legislative debates, the hysterical Internet messages, the
mindless shouting on televised talk shows-more spectacular
illustrations than I have chosen. Indeed, some of my examples, such
as the Minnesota Supreme Court's use of federal doctrinal language in
interpreting state constitutional provisions, or the computer-generated
voice used by the National Weather Service, may seem
unexceptionable. And all of my examples have some redeeming
aspects. Even President Clinton's public displays of affection and
religiosity may have represented, under the circumstances, a limited
kind of symbolic moral leadership. Certainly, an understanding of the
concrete effects of both abortions and abortion bans is highly relevant
to moral deliberation. Upon consideration, however, each of my
illustrations is dismaying in important and depressingly familiar
respects.
23. Id. at 1091.
24. Id.
25. Friedman v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991), discussed
in Intellect and Craft: The Contributions of Justice Hans Linde to American
Constitutionalism 92 (Robert F. Nagel ed., 1995) [hereinafter Intellect and Craft].
26. Friedman,473 N.W.2d at 833 n.4.
27. Id. at 832-34.
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An obvious problem with Clinton's actions, for example, is that
they substituted gesture for substance. The public, of course, is well
aware that national politicians routinely stage events and that some
part of the resulting "message" may well be substantively false. This
knowledge can produce cynicism, or it can produce a limited
suspension of disbelief whereby the audience treats political gestures
as a part of the game, like a literary convention, to be taken seriously
at the same time they are understood to be fictional. Public discourse
based on gesture, then, tends to lead to either of two characteristically
modem developments: political withdrawal or shallow, play-like
participation.
Governor Fob James' challenge to Supreme Court interpretations
of the religion clauses was in the abstract both substantive and
important.' It sounded like a foolish joke, however, partly because
governors, especially southern governors, do not have the intellectual
or moral stature to question a respected national institution like the
Court and partly because the political hopelessness of his cause made
his threat to "resist... with all ... means I can muster" sound like yet

another empty gesture. 29 By way of contrast, the Pennsylvania
legislative debate achieved some respectability but only by minimizing
substance. The disturbing jurisprudential and institutional questions
arising from the Court's abortion decisions were not explored.
Indeed, in graphic contrast to the Casey Court's later charge that
political "fire" was threatening its authority and the rule of law,2 1the
legislative debate actually reinforced the legitimacy of the Court's
role. All sides used as touchstones for the propriety of their positions
strained interpretations of existing cases or predictions about how the
Court might rule in the future. As so often happens, a potentially
profound political and constitutional debate was reduced to crass

legalistic analysis.
Judicial nominees Breyer and Souter used personal anecdotes to
evade answering questions. Senators and their constituents could
read whatever answer they wanted into their meandering stories.
Moreover, reliance on autobiographical

details, while probably

interesting and sometimes revealing, has the unfortunate consequence
of moving significant political events in the direction of soap opera.
The substitution of the personal, the simplistic, and the sentimental
for the political-a trend that increasingly dominates presidential

28. The scholarship that sharply questions the Court's Establishment Clause

jurisprudence is, of course, voluminous. For a specific effort to evaluate Governor
James' constitutional claims, see Jonathan P. Brose, In Birminghan They Love the
Governor: Why the Fourteenth Amendment Does not Incorporate the Establishment
Clause, 24 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1 (1998).
29. James, State of the State Address, supra note 12, at 86.
30. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,867 (1992).
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politics and now can be commonly found even in the judicial
nominating process-infantilizes public debate.31
The testimony in the hearings of abortion legislation is nothing if
not substantive. But both the clinically cruel description of the socalled "partial-birth abortion" procedure and the highly emotional
claims about "back-alley butchers" and blindfolded women are, like
Breyer's and Souter's testimony, efforts to personalize policy debate.32

Moreover, like televised pictures of the return of dead soldiers in
bodybags, this kind of information is in some ways too powerful. It is
so urgent and one-sided as to leave no room for broader perspective
or compromise. It makes opponents into enemies and thus induces
both hatred and a sense of futility.

Worse, these defects are

progressive, for extreme moral claims of this kind can be answered
only by ratcheting up the intensity of argumentation. As charges fly
back and forth, even the very basic inhibition against using falsehoods
begins to drop away.33

The computer-generated voice of the National Weather Service is
in many ways the opposite of the legislative debates on abortion. The
subject matter is benign and non-controversial; this is the government
as concerned friend rather than moral arbiter. Moreover, the voice
has no individuality and no regional associations, and it can be heard
all across the country. Thus, it reinforces the sense that we are one
people without potentially divisive variations. Nevertheless, especially
because the government is speaking to its citizens out of concern for
31. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18. Especially egregious in this regard
was the confirmation testimony of Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Asked what in her own
experience led her to devote so much of her career to breaking down the legal
barriers "to the advancement of the women in our society," she replied with a series
of personal stories. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 134-35 (1993) (statement of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
There was a story about when Ginsburg as a female law student was denied access to
a room in the law library. Her account was made more vivid by this detail:
[I]t was quite late at night, and I wanted to make sure I got home by
midnight. My daughter, the professor (now) was then fourteen months
old -no, that was my second year, so she was a few months over two years
old. And I wanted to look up the citation, report back, and return home.
Id. There followed stories about the exclusion of her mother-in-law from a Harvard
Law Review banquet, about dormitory rules at Cornell and Harvard, and about a
conversation with a waitress about a "most adorable steward" encountered on a
transpacific flight. Id.
32. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
33. During the congressional debate over the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act,
Douglas Johnson asserted that opponents of the Bill had lied on a number of issues,
including when Ron Fitzsimmons, Executive Director of the National Coalition of
Abortion Providers said that the procedure was used less than 500 times a year. Joint
Hearing, supra note 19, at 38. According to Johnson, Fitzsimmons admitted that this
was a lie and explained, "I just went out there [before various media outlets] and
spouted the party line." Id. Johnson claimed that the correct number was 2,000. Id. at
46. For other alleged falsehoods, see id. at 41-53.
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health and safety, it is jarring to hear a voice that is a rather perfect
expression, disembodied and rote, of impersonal bureaucracy.
Moreover, the message establishes an inappropriate relationship
between government and citizen inasmuch as the government seems
to be assuming that its citizens are unaware of the most obvious
dangers and, like children, require the most elementary advice.
The public service advertisement about the importance of
fatherhood is bothersome for similar reasons. To be advised by the
government that it is important to be "your kids' dad" is only slightly
less insulting and a good deal more vacuous than to be instructed to
watch out for water while lying in a ditch during a storm. What
exactly is the government telling us about fatherhood? Children are
better off if "dads" don't leave home, apparently, but the ad does not
even advise fathers to stay at home; instead, it encourages "emotional
and financial support"-and not on the ground that this will avoid the
distressing outcomes that are itemized but because this will give the
child "a better chance." The Department of Health and Human
Services believes that citizens are so bankrupt and yet so malleable
that they will be able to benefit from this brief and vapid piece of
advice. And the messenger, this time a real voice, is actually as
impersonal as the Weather Service's announcer. The speaker is
unidentified and, like the computer, is not using his own words;
despite his earnestness, he is generating lines that have been written
for him. This charade is all the worse because it trivializes
something-the importance of family ties-that relates to the deepest
instincts of the individual and the strongest interests of society.
Advice on the significance of fatherhood from a family member or a
friend or even a physician can have great importance precisely
because it is the opposite of the public service message: it comes from
someone who is known and trusted, it is heartfelt, and it arises out of
two-way conversations that are grounded in experience and as
detailed as necessary.
Judge Posner's voice, in one way the opposite of the public service
ad, is strong and substantive. 4 But to whom is all this erudition being
addressed? Surely not to the owner or patrons of the Kitty Kat
Lounge, where the expressive activity had taken place, and surely not
to practicing lawyers, and-one supposes-not to the public generally.
Each of those groups knows perfectly well that nude dancing is
expressive, and each knows what it expresses. Like the Weather
Service warning and the public service ad, Posner lectures as if the
public were ignorant. And, even assuming that somewhere there is an
audience in need of basic instruction on the erotic nature of nude
dancing, what can account for Posner's embarrassingly lavish

34. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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commitment of intellectual resources? His opinion is the voice of a
government that is at once superior and ridiculous.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion has none of Posner's force
or individuality." It is in fact, as Judge Hans Linde has demonstrated,
a weak and inappropriate imitation.36 A state constitution, which has
its own text and history and authority, is interpreted as if it were a
knock-off of the federal Constitution. Worse, the words that are
being appropriated are not the impressive words of the original text
but the stilted and clumsy doctrinal formulations of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices interpreting their text.
Like the unexpressive
computer-generated voice of the Weather Service, the words of the
formulaic constitution can be heard all across the country.
III. CENTRALIZATION AND DEFICIENT DIALOGUE

The empirical hypotheses that emerge from these observations are
that, on the one hand, political dialogue at the state level probably
tends to be bland, insubstantial, derivative, and unserious and, on the
other, that political dialogue at the national level may often be
spectacular, extreme, dishonest, personalized, polarized, and staged.
These hypotheses are, I think, consistent with common impressions.
More importantly, they are consistent with the basic conditions under
which modern political dialogue is conducted.
Those conditions are matters of common knowledge and
elementary inference. First, the range of subject matter that is
relevant to national political discourse includes not only issues, like
foreign policy, that are not ordinarily relevant to state-based discourse
but also virtually everything, including safety and health care and
education, that is discussed within state-based venues. Second, the
potential audience for national political discourse is, by definition, far
larger and more varied than for any state-based discourse. This
means that even when the issues under consideration are held
constant, national decision-making will be more complex because (if
for no other reason) the scale is greater. It also means that, again, if
the issues are identical, the potential consequences of national
decision-making are more significant than for more localized decisionmaking. Third, while electronic forms of communication are used at
both levels, nationalized discourse is relatively distant and, therefore,
is characterized by a lower proportion of personalized contact and a
higher proportion of remote or abstract communication.
One of the consequences of these conditions is to create what might
be called a "winner-take-all" political market. 37 Just as a few top
35. See supra notes 25-27 and accompany text.
36. See Intellect and Craft, supra note 25, at 92.
37. This phrase and much of the ensuing analysis is adapted from Robert H.
Frank & Philip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society: Why the Few at the Top Get
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performers in professional sports or fiction-writing can now dominate
entire national (and, indeed, international) economic markets, a
relatively few leaders can now dominate a vast political market. Once
a certain level of prominence is achieved, the words and images and
policies of these leaders can be communicated across the whole
nation. As Robert Frank and Philip Cook say of economic markets,
"What is new is the rapid erosion of the barriers that once prevented
the top performers from serving broader markets."'
"Winner-take-all" markets have many advantages, but one
disadvantage is what the sociologist William Goode termed "[t]he
failure of the somewhat less popular. '39 Just as the dizzying returns
available to the few who attend elite law schools creates hypercompetition for admission to those schools,' the astonishing power
and prestige available to the few who become national leaders means
that the somewhat less important state institutions, like second-tier
law schools, suffer a disproportionate loss of attention and prestige.
The bland, derivative quality of political discourse at the state level,
then, is a predictable result of the demise of any real limitation on
national regulatory power combined with the modem information
revolution.
In contrast, the hyper-competition for national power naturally will
tend to produce leaders, like President Clinton, who are enormously
skilled and colorful. Because the issues that these leaders confront
are massive in scale and complexity and because the leaders must
communicate from a relatively remote stage, it is predictable that they
should personalize issues and resort to symbolic gestures.
Personalization allows a large and uneasy public to focus on what they
can easily understand and ultimately allows for trust in the leader to
substitute for substantive evaluation of complex issues. Gestures of
the sort that Clinton made, moreover, are reassuringly simple and can
be efficiently communicated.
Governor James' ill-fated effort to challenge the Court's
Establishment Clause cases was in part a "failure of the somewhat less
popular." His effort appeared even more pathetic than it was because
the prestige and power of the Court dwarfed the status of a state
officer. The fact that his analysis might have been as good as the
Court's meant no more than the fact that a relatively unknown
writer's novel is as good (or almost as good) as a recognized bestselling author's when both compete for a publisher or a reviewer." As
this dynamic continuously plays out, it becomes obvious to all that the
quality of state-level arguments challenging decisions of august
So Much More Than the Rest of Us (1995).
38. Id. at 45.
39. Quoted in id at 3.
40. Id. at 11-14.
41. Id. at 192-93.

2070

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

national institutions will be discounted or ignored. Consequently,
even those who have powerful objections to the decisions of national
institutions often attempt to frame their positions as if they were
consistent with or even derivative from the very decisions they
condemn. Like the Pennsylvania legislators proposing a law aimed at
overturning Roe v. Wade, such critics end up reflexively reinforcing
the prestige of national institutions.
Federal judicial nominees resort to sentimental anecdotes for many
of the same reasons that President Clinton told the nation that he
loves his wife. But this device is responsive to another aspect of
nationalized communication as well. The larger and more diverse the
audience and the more significant the issue, the more the leader faces
the likelihood of deeply offending some significant segment of the
public.
The potential rewards of gaining national office are
extraordinary but the danger of infuriating opponents is almost
unavoidable. One solution is to tell vague or sentimentalized
autobiographical stories into which each segment of the public can
read acceptable morals.
Paradoxically, when salient issues cannot be evaded or
personalized, the incentives of nationalized discourse encourage stark,
exaggerated, and dishonest claims. This is so because, first, in a
"winner-take-all" competition the difference between first and second
place is the difference between day and night and because, second,
each contestant knows that the other will be tempted to resort to
extreme measures.42 National political discourse on issues like
abortion moves quickly to extreme and divisive charges for the same
reason that professional athletes are tempted to take steroids and
televised sit-coms get ever raunchier. There are, of course, limits on
this kind of competitive degeneration. Personal ethical standards,
group pressures, and cultural expectations all set boundaries. The
speakers strutting on the national stage are by definition, however,
relatively distanced from the types of primary associations that create
and enforce such constraints. Moreover, the members of these
associations feel distanced from the national leader as well.

The

national leader, having become larger than life is presumably subject
to pressures and rules that do not apply to everyday people. Hence,
even those primary associations that do manage contact with the
national leader may be uncharacteristically restrained and ineffectual.
Since one key to being a winner-who-takes-all is to utilize
inexpensive communication that reaches a very wide audience,
nationalized debate depends heavily on quick visual symbols, sound
bites, and other highly economical methods.43 The Weather Service
replaced its human announcers with a single computer-generated
42. See id. at 127, 195-96.
43. See id. at 196.
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voice in order to save the costs of printing out and reading forecasts
and warnings. This change has the disadvantage of making the
national government seem even more remote and faceless, a difficulty
that might well encourage the agency to compensate by issuing ever
more messages of concern. These messages are often so strikingly
condescending partly because the national government is in fact
relatively remote from, and out of touch with, its audience and partly
because in so large an audience there are bound to be measurable
numbers of risk-takers and incompetents.
The Health and Human Services admonition to "be your kids' dad"
is not only condescending but also inappropriately familiar and empty.
Vacuousness, like condescension, is a predictable result of the size and
heterogeneity of the national audience. After all, this country
contains many subgroups that hold strikingly different views about
parental roles and responsibilities.
It would be profoundly
threatening to have the distant and uncontrollable national
government seeking to improve childrearing practices unless that
government's influence came in the form of ostensibly chummy advice
rather than coercive rules and unless the advice itself were so vague as
to be compatible with virtually any conception of fatherhood.
Judge Posner's lavish opinion on the erotic messages conveyed by
nude dancing is precisely the kind of excessive investment to be
expected from the winner-take-all contests spawned by a vast political
market. As Frank and Cook point out, the differences in skill
between a championship tennis star and a second-tier player may be
so slight as to be imperceptible to all except experts and fanatics.'
Nevertheless, the few who reach star status will have their matches
broadcast around the world while the players just below the top play
in relative obscurity. Posner is one of the few federal judges not on
the Supreme Court who can compete for national recognition and
influence. His judicial decisions get attention from other jurists and
from professors at elite national law schools, and his books, which are
published by eminent presses and reviewed in places like the New
York Review of Books, affect the thinking of national opinion leaders.
The extravagance of his writing in the nude dancing case, then, is
designed to display his learning and his intellect, especially as against
Judge Frank Easterbrook, who wrote an elaborate dissenting
opinion45 and who is, of course, another intellectually prominent
conservative. Championship matches are better than they have to
be-sometimes ridiculously good.
Those who toil in relative obscurity, like the Minnesota Supreme
Court, suffer the consequences of over-investment at the top.
44. Id. at 24.
45. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081,
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting).

1120 (7th Cir. 1990)
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Original, thoughtful research into the specific circumstances and
history of a state constitution will not get the national limelight. Most
of the best clerks, who might have helped with that research, attended
elite national law schools, not the state law school, and went to clerk
for someone like Posner or Easterbrook. Indeed, even the faculty at
the state law school is unlikely to concentrate much on state
constitutional law or the state legal system generally. If consulted by
the Minnesota jurists, their writings will probably point right back to
the doctrines of federal constitutional law. These doctrines do not
have the flair and power of a Posner opinion, but they are fairly easy
to find and to utilize. The voices of state institutions begin, like the
voice of some vast bureaucracy in Washington, to sound mechanical
and homogenized.
CONCLUSION

Given the current eclipse of state institutions, which have suffered
the sad fate of "the somewhat less popular" in a winner-take-all
society, state-based constitutional dialogue, if it somehow could be
instituted, might be dull or indirect. Nevertheless, those who favor
politicizing constitutional discourse might usefully give state
institutions more consideration. If constitutional discourse could be
moved from the federal courts to state institutions, politics at the state
and local level might well gain in significance and dignity. Some of
the intellectual and personal resources now so committed to the
national stage might begin to disperse. In short, state participation in
constitutional interpretation might be a partial solution to the
unhealthy communicative dynamics now in place.
If this happened, localized constitutional discourse would have
certain inherent advantages over nationalized discourse. Participants
would be more likely to have had some personal contact with one
another. They could draw more on common experience. There might
be less need for gestures and evasions. Debate might be less
personalized, less extreme, and less threatening. Issues examined at a
smaller scale might be more understandable, and words might be used
to convey more content.
On the other hand, it may not be possible-or for some reason it
may be thought undesirable-to include state-based dialogue in
political debate about the meaning of the Constitution. In this event,
proponents of non-judicial interpretation should, at the least, confront
the likelihood that constitutional discourse will often be carried on in
ways that are just as cheap and demeaning as much of the rest of our
national political life.

